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Studies on corruption in Turkey typically shine the spotlight on the triad of politician-bureaucrat-
businessman and restrict their focus to irregularities and abuses in the public domain. Such studies, 
framed by the paradigm set forth in the international campaign against corruption by the World 
Bank/Transparency International (TI) naturally, overlook the sociology of corruption or the political 
economy of corruption.  Rather, they consist in the repetition of formulae of this paradigm on waging 
war against corruption and offer recommendations in this vein to the political authority.  This is not to 
deny the fact that the battle against corruption is a subject whose responsibility solely belongs to the 
politician.  Moreover, at least in appearance, numerous legal and institutional organizations in keeping 
with the paradigm for the battle against international corruption have been executed and numerous 
instances of corruption have been delivered to the judiciary by the police forces.  Nonetheless, it is 
obvious that Turkey has been less than successful in waging an effective war against corruption on 
both the small and large-scale levels. 
 
In our opinion, success in the battle against corruption will depend on close scrutiny of two 
fundamental aspects, apart from the conventional measures.  The first of these is the state mentality, 
which demarcates the boundaries of political life in Turkey and suppresses the dynamics of social life.  
Ever since the founding of the republic in 1923, the sphere left open to politicians in Turkey has been 
under the control of the government bureaucracy and it has been successively reduced in the wake of 
every military takeover.  Particularly since the takeover in 1980, the economic sphere now comprises 
the sole instrument remaining to the politician for the conduct of politics.  The civil society and 
government relations have traced a parallel path during this period in Turkey. 
 
Second is the legal and institutional framework, which, to all appearances has no direct relation with 
corruption, but which marks off the framework of the internal dynamics of political life and, 
correspondingly, relations between the politician and society.  Unfortunately, this framework weakens 
Turkish political life in terms of representation, participation, and democracy and prepares the ground 
for corruption by facilitating patronage and clientelistic relations, both at the center and in the 
periphery. This infrastructure boasts two major underpinnings—the Law on Political Parties and the 
bylaws of the Turkish Grand National Assembly. 
 
In short, we believe that the manner of conducting politics in Turkey must be subjected to examination 
and changed in order to wage an effective battle against corruption.  Consequently, the two basic 
characteristics of Turkish political life to be emphasized in the present paper represent those that 
veritably doom the politician to corruption.  Without question, it is feasible to alter these 
characteristics.  But, in the event there is no common ground to unite both the politicians and the 
voters with regard to changing the way politics is conducted, it is anticipated that the persons or groups 
 5 
who demand changes in the way it is conducted, regardless of whether or not they are political, will be 
perceived as “spoilsports” and exposed to injury in the medium and long term. 
 
Throughout the history of the country, the reflexes displayed by the government vis-à-vis the civil 
society have been shaped by a lack of trust of the latter:  an ongoing state of conflict exists between the 
state and the civil society and which winds up with the latter being the inevitable loser.  Unlike in the 
West, in playing by rules that hinder and penalize civil society at every turn, the government in Turkey 
represents a true aristocracy that imposes its own values on society and prevents the emergence of a 
bourgeoisie on the western model in the political development of Turkey.1 The chain of these rules is 
fashioned by a society envisioned in the mind of the bureaucracy, which has periodically urged the 
adoption of its own version of a civil society by a Jacobin and/or oppressive stance.  Inasmuch as the 
members of the civil society have not participated in their making and are unable comprehend their 
rationale, they have failed to assimilate these rules and incorporate them into their own value systems.  
The natural outcome is that they, along with those who represent them politically, show no hesitation 
in breaking the said rules in the belief that they will not be caught, and they tirelessly seek to ascertain 
ways of benefiting from the loopholes in these rules. 
 
The fact that social conflicts in Turkey have not yet been resolved and that individuals feel a lack of 
trust of those outside their own group is a consequence of the authoritarian character of the 
government.2  Because of the paternalistic and patriarchal properties of the culture, this lack of trust 
has pervaded even deeper a society that has not internalized the reality of individual freedom and has 
led to the search for a group/community by the individual to obtain a sense of trust.  This circumstance 
is an important factor in effecting the internalization of the forms of relations that can be described as 
patronage and clientelism.  It forms one of the most critical obstacles to political parties’ making the 
transition from “politics,” wherein they take care of their own, to “policy,” whereby the public interest 
is promoted. 
 
The field for manoeuvring reserved for politics and the politician has been gradually eroded as an 
outcome of the military takeovers that occurred at intervals of roughly one per decade (1960, 1971, 
and 1980).  Authoritarianism ultimately reached a peak during the military regime of 12 September 
1980, which by means of its legislative activities, its impact permeated almost every area, and the reins 
of the power of the state over the political and social dynamics, were held by the military bureaucracy, 
which was institutionalized in a manner unlike any such in democratic countries.  The upshot of this 
                                                 
1
 Metin Heper, “Türkiye’de Siyasal Ahlakın Tarihsel Boyutları,” in Türker Alkan, ed., Siyasal Ahlak ve Siyasal Ahlaksızlık 
(Ankara:  Bilgi Yayınevi, 1993), 369. 
2
 According to the data in the 2007 World Values Survey report, Turkey possesses the lowest percentage of “trust” of all 
the countries surveyed. For the data see  
<www.betam.bahcesehir.edu.tr/UserFiles/File/sunum/betamsunum7.2.08.ppt.>.  Similarly, the BBVA Foundation survey 
conducted in 2006, "Social Capital:  Trust, Networks, and Involvement in Associations in 13 Countries," the results 
showed that “those who least trusted others were Turks with a rating of 4.4 out of a possible 10.  For the full text of the 
report, see <http://www.fbbva.es/TLFU/dat/social_capital_survey.pdf>. 
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period and afterwards, during which liberal economic policies came into force, is that the direction of 
the economy became the only sphere remaining open to the free exercise of power by the politicians. 
 
The legal system that was constructed along with the shift to a liberal economy during the 12 
September military regime and directed toward penalizing ideological crimes rather than the protection 
of economic, social, and individual rights was a factor motivating the politician’s opportunistic 
exploitation of the economic sphere for himself and his cronies. 
 
On the other hand, the Law on Political Parties, which was drawn up under the 12 September military 
regime and which has preserved its essential outlines despite a few emendations, was intended to bind 
the political parties to the authority of the leader authority and the politician to that of the leader.  It 
was injected wholecloth into the fabric of the political parties, which, on the macro level, revealed a 
democracy deficiency and, on the micro level, a full-blown authoritarian mentality, which found 
expression in the organization of the political parties in an hierarchical and oligarchical manner.  The 
law, whose aim was to formulate the basic principles pertaining to political parties, has unfortunately 
resulted in parties whose internal organization today is a far cry from democracy in action.  The law, 
which imposes no restrictions on the duration of the term of general secretary of the party, in practice, 
permits the general secretary such privileges as arbitrarily dissolving party memberships, removing 
from office the administrative heads of provinces and districts and provincial and district 
administrators, and determining the deputy candidates and their ranking.3 
 
This phenomenon, known as the “leader oligarchy” is preserved by all political parties.  Furthermore, 
according to the party bylaws that are drawn up in the spirit of the Law on Political Parties, the 
initiative of the party members, in particular, that of the deputies, is eliminated, so that, as has been 
observed by Çaha, political parties have been reshaped into “modern-day religious communities.”4  In 
terms of the center, the function of the deputy in this composition remains limited to raising his finger 
whenever the party leader calls for a vote and registering an “aye” or “nay” as desired by the party 
leader.  The reflection of the will of the voters for those whom the party head had elected or appointed 
should, naturally, not be anticipated.  The deputies, acutely aware of the pressure of the head of the 
party and the party group, generally participate in the voting without knowing precisely what they are 
voting for.  In any case, a “group decision” is usually taken.  Moreover, the bylaws of the Turkish 
Grand National Assembly were changed to support this situation.5  The bylaws have reduced the time 
allotted for consideration of the bills and proposal in the interest of accelerating the parliamentary 
procedures and limited the number of speakers and time periods for the recommendations of the 
                                                 
3
 Süheyl Batum, Türkiye’de Demokratikleşme Perspektifleri ve AB Kopenhag Siyasal Kriterleri—Görüşler ve Öncelikler, 
No. 1:  Siyasal Partiler,” (Istanbul:  TÜSĐAD Publications, 2001), 15-39. 
4
 Ömer Çaha, “Türkiye’de Siyasal Partiler ve Avrupa Birliği”  
<www.fatih.edu.tr/~omercaha/Makaleler/Turkce??%20Makaleler/.../SiyasiPartilerveAvrupaBirligi.doc, 233>. 
5
 The proposal for changing the by-laws to accelerate the process for bills and proposals was accepted in the Turkish Grand 
National Assembly Plenary Session in February, 2001.   
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deputies.  Under the circumstances, the bylaws lead to an inadequate airing of any proposal or bill by 
the deputies, who are compelled to conform to party discipline. 
 
Nonetheless, the swearing by the deputy of an unconditional oath of allegiance to the leader may not 
suffice to guarantee his re-election.  This is revealed by a review of the turnover in the parliament over 
the past terms, coming to a very high value of nearly 62%. 
 
Table 1. Percentage of Newcomers to the Turkish Grand National Assembly 
Election 
Year 
New Deputies (%) Election 
Year 
New Deputies (%) 
1950 76 1977 58 
1954 51 1983 86 
1957 61 1987 51 
1961 74 1991 59 
1965 61 1995 55 
1969 60 1999 56 
1973 64   
Source:  Tarhan Erdem, “Meclis’te Yenilenme,” Radikal (10 September 2002),  
<http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=49344>. 
 
 
Another critical aspect is the tangible assets required by deputies for their election.  It is a rational 
expectation that any deputy who fears that the leader may hesitate in placing his name on the list of 
candidates for re-election will wish to recover his expenses in the shortest time possible and maximize 
his earnings. 
 
Therefore, on condition that the deputy does not to make himself a public spectacle, serve as fodder for 
the opposition, serve as the focus of excessive criticism by the press, and thus not result in a loss of 
votes for the party, his full allegiance usually causes the leader to develop a greater tolerance towards 
his arrangements for securing benefits for himself. 
 
Another significant drawback of the Law on Political Parties, which directly opens the door to 
corruption, pertains to “the transparency and oversight of the party accounts and election spending for 
both the party and the candidate.” Financial support, which is wholly entrusted to the honesty of the 
leader, is a customary element of Turkish political life. 
 
To sum up, in this scene where politics is confined to the economic sphere and the political parties are 
hemmed in by the authority of the leader, and the individual takes refuge in the “community,” the 
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political expectations of the politician as well as the political expectations of the society are resigned to 
the maximization of the economic interests of the individual/group regardless of their form. 
 
Today, the activities that are categorized as corruption by TI, the World Bank, and similar international 
organizations are the forms of conducting politics in Turkey that have been adopted and/or whose 
adoption has been compelled.  In this context, the principal difference that emerged with economic 
liberalism is the size of the resources controlled by the politician and the broadening of the 
opportunities for distribution, along with the increase in the number of players who wish to take 
advantage of these resources.  In other words, on condition that the rules of the game remain the same, 
the “amount of the money on the table” and the number of players have increased. 
 
Hence, the distribution of public resources ever since the era of the single-party regime at the time of 
the republic differs from that of the welfare state, which implements policies of distribution in a more 
systematic fashion and is carried out by focussing on certain groups. In the process, characterized by 
the desire to create one’s own wealth, the poor who comprise the majority of the voters are provided 
with what Herbert Kitschelt, in his definition of clientelism, calls “hush money” and this form of 
distribution is pursued in the context of patronage relations rather than of public service.6  In other 
words, the focus today on exposing the politician as a target in relation to corruption is an 
unsatisfactory approach for the reason that, not only businessmen but also a significant proportion of 
the voters have been profiting by this same skewed mechanism of distribution since the establishment 
of the republic. While keeping in mind the religious community-type structure that was noted above 
and the constricted political arena, it can yet be stated that the way in which the relations develop 
between the politician-businessman and the politician-voter makes it clear that the politician is not 
solely responsible for the corruption economy, but rather that he is only one of the parties. 
 
 
Relations between the Politician and Businessman 
 
Wealth in Turkey differs from that in the West in that it has developed through dependence on public 
resources; in other words, it is created rather than acquired.  On the other hand, the politician’s 
disposal power makes itself constantly felt in the business world, whether for fair or unfair reasons. 
This circumstance has encouraged the business world to constantly cultivate close ties with the 
government in power.  At present, this form of relationship, whose viability strongly persists, is shaped 
by an explicit oath of allegiance by the business world to the politician or is indirectly shaped by the 
climate of lack of trust and/or opportunism. 
 
                                                 
6
 Herbert Kitschelt, “Linkages Between Citizens and Politicians in Democratic Polities,” Comparative Political Studies 33, 
6/7 (August/ September 2000): 873. 
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The chief issues that can serve to “breakdown trust”  between politicians and the political-business 
world may be identified, as follows:  a) arbitrary practices with regard to the nationalized (sector), 
most especially in connection with compensation paid for buildings and land; b) arbitrary use of 
authority in granting permits and oversight of construction projects by local administrators (such as 
introducing bureaucratic obstacles or facilitations in the course of granting permits or the illegal 
granting of construction permits); c) the authority of the prime minister to intervene directly in 
economic life without the approval of the parliament or in the coverage of a law by means of a 
governmental decision; d) the power to make certain decisions retrospective and which bear extremely 
critical import on the private sector;7 e) the authority to have regulatory bodies (for example, the 
Energy Market Regulatory Commission, the Ministry of Finance, the Prime Ministry Customs 
Permanent Undersecretariat, and the Radio and Television Broadcasting Board) act in accordance with 
the preferences of the government in power; f) the possibilities to personally produce a rival to 
businessmen whom they believe has not provided sufficient support of the political government. 
 
On the other hand, those with political power can open the doors of opportunity for the business world 
by making their presence felt in a) revising public works plans, so as to create urban economic rent by 
means of the local administrations; b) determining the recipients of credit extended by the national 
banks; and c) distributing incentives to the private sector by the relative criteria of political distance 
rather than economic rationality distance, and tailoring the requirements for bidders in the letting of 
public contracts on the basis of simple preference. 
 
Then again, in order to gain insight into the mechanism of corruption, notice must be taken of the 
other side of the relation between the businessman and politician. Hence, it is apparent that every 
government that has managed to stay in power for an extended period of time has tended to embark on 
the path of creating a rich class of its own during its term in power and that efforts are made to form an 
alternative source to provide benefits strictly for itself.  It has been a given that, whenever the 
resources of political parties are insufficiently regulated, the financing of the political party by a 
businessman would be secured and/or that the financing activities of an individual who will increase 
the percentage of votes of the party would be mobilized.  At this point, a distinction needs to be made 
between the financing of politics and the financing of a politician in the relation between the 
businessman and politics.  The first situation is the offering by the businessman of the resources for 
which the political party as an institution feels the need in exchange for becoming wealthy.  
 
What needs to be understood concerning the latter situation, however, is the relation between the 
businessman (principal) and the deputy (agent) who is financed by the former .  At times, some 
businessmen who wish to expand their business and gain more wealth prefer to enter politics directly, 
without the benefit of an intermediary.  In fact, apart from those persons who form a showcase for the 
party, the existing political system tends to permit those who furnish financial support for the political 
                                                 
7
 Ayşe Buğra, Devlet ve Đşadamları (Istanbul:  Iletişim Publications, 1995), 233-239. 
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party to enter politics.  A glance over the parliaments of the past twenty years reveals the important 
fact that the small number of “worker” deputies constitutes a failure to reflect the masses-
representative relationship in the political arena. 
 
 
The Politician-Voter Relationship 
 
Though a significant proportion of the voters in Turkey express the view that they are generally 
disturbed by the corruption economy, they do not refrain from taking advantage of any such 
opportunities when offered them.  As a number of academic studies have shown, the primary 
expectation of politics by the average voters in Turkey is an increase in economic prosperity.8  We are 
convinced that the voters are aware of the restrictions placed on the politician by the government.  That 
is why they possess a realistic attitude with regard to what and how much the politician can do.  
Despite the negative impact of corruption on economic prosperity in the medium and long term, the 
myopic voters directed toward increasing their own prosperity in the short term find no difficulty in 
discovering justifiable reasons on their own and in entering into the relational networks that nurture 
corruption. 
 
At base, the way of conducting politics in Turkey does not require the politician to establish close ties 
with the voters for whom he wishes in appearance to represent.  Particularly, the type of relation that 
exists between those involved in the making of politics at the centre and the voters that prevails in 
democratic countries is not valid for Turkey.  In Turkey, the voters seek a resolution to the problems 
faced in their own daily life rather than the success of the person elected in solving the structural issues 
of the locale or the country. 
 
Voters who display distinctive properties, such as being a fellow countryman, kinsman, acquaintance, 
or occupying a place in a political party organization may be said to possess a much higher possibility 
of reaching those who conduct politics at the centre or at the local level and of being included in the 
relational network noted above.  They make use of such possibilities in order to facilitate practical 
aspects of their lives, such as getting an appointment, obtaining employment, and locating a place to 
admit a patient in a government hospital.9  In the eyes of the voter, this is an affirmation in itself of a 
politics of favoritism.  Hence, for the Turkish citizen, the first step in establishing one’s relations with 
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 Fikret Adaman, Ali Çarkoğlu, and Burhan Şenatalar, Türkiye’de Yerel ve Merkezi Yönetimlerde Hizmetlerden Tatmin, 
Patronaj Đlişkileri ve Reform (Istanbul:  TESEV, 2004); Bekir Ağırdır, “Elections ’07:  What Determined the Contents of 
the Ballot Box?” Konda Research and Consultancy, Radikal (25–28 July 2007). 
<http://www.konda.com.tr/html/dosyalar/inside_of_the_box.pdf>, 2.; Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, “Turkish Politics:  A Look at 
Voters, Institutions, and Democracy in Turkey,” a paper presented at CEPS/Brussels (13 October 2008). 
9
 Can Dündar, “Meclis’teki danışmanlar ne işe yarar?” Milliyet (12 Ekim 2008), 
<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/Yazar.aspx?aType=YazarDetay&ArticleID=1001949&AuthorID=75&b=Meclisteki??%??20?
?%20danismanlar??%20ne??%20ise??%20yarar&a=Can??%20Dundar>. 
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the state is to “find one’s man.” On the other hand, it is an undeniable reality that certain activities that 
could be described as corruption today keep the poor, in particular, from going under. 
 
Due to the consistent mismanagement of limited resources, insufficient employment opportunities, 
high levels of migration from the rural areas to the towns and the increase in population, the informal 
sector has attained incredible proportions; particularly since 1980, the broad masses of the poor, in an 
atmosphere that better affords a sphere for action by comparison with the earlier social actors, have 
sought means of bettering their own standards of living by utilizing the opportunities of this sector.10 
The newcomers, by joining the existing webs of solidarity fostered by cultural or ethnic origins, and, 
most notably, by the essential factor of hailing from the same hometown, have solved the problems of 
finding a job and a place to stay—the basic conditions for being able to keep a foothold in the town.  
Over time, thanks to these networks, the poor segments have even been able to grasp the possibility, 
however small, of becoming wealthy.  However, the maintenance of a foothold in the cities and, if 
possible, become prosperous for such a huge population in the informal sector depends on two 
conditions:  squatting on the expansive public lands in the urban outskirts and offering them to their 
close ones and the willingness of politicians to overlook this fait accompli.11 
 
A glance over even only the past few years will furnish numerous examples illustrating complete 
agreement with regard to the creation of economic rent among the political parties, particularly at the 
level of the local administrators in the metropolitan areas, with such actions as distributing deeds to 
buildings constructed without permits or on public land, to the poor segment in exchange for votes. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The present conditions for the conduct of politics (the restrictions placed by the will of the government 
on politics and the lack of democracy within the party due to the leader oligarchy) and for the 
politician to survive today under these natural outcomes (the lack of trust in the social structure as a 
consequence of the never-ending clash between state and society, the desire to overcome this failure by 
the networks of communal solidarity, the fact that too few of the voters enter into the quest for 
democracy, and the constant demand by businessmen for government support) means becoming 
involved to a lesser or greater extent in a number of activities that are defined as corruption in the 
West.  To perceive the politician as the chief culprit of corruption means to ignore his cohorts in the 
corruption relationship, so that this presents an obstacle in the consideration of this issue and in 
developing proposals for its resolution. 
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 Oğuz Işık and M. Melih Pınarcıoğlu, “Nöbetleşe Yoksulluktan Kuralsız Yoksulluğa,” Görüş (Temmuz 2003): 51. 
11
 Ibid., 52. 
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Today, to be able to battle against the corruption in Turkey in a realistic manner and to be able to 
achieve successful results, first of all, a political will directed at changing the conditions that have been 
noted and, behind that political will, a broad voter support are necessary.  One must see the necessity 
of a broad package of countermeasures for the battle strategy against corruption in Turkey that places 
highest importance on the creation of an understanding of participatory democracy and institutional 
instruments.  Similarly, participatory democracy will produce free will and free will be accompanied 
by control.  The problems that have arisen due to the eternal conflict between state and society and the 
state and the politician form today in a number of areas an obstacle to the formation of a sound public 
conscience. In this picture, the composition of the relation established generally in the society by the 
political representative focii is far removed from achieving activity en masse. 
 
On the other hand, so long as the boundaries that the state itself has established remain intact, one 
cannot expect the politician to abandon his economic tools that grant him the authority to award or, in 
certain instances, to penalize both the businessman and the voting masses, i.e., the sources of his 
subsistence in the political arena.  To state it differently, so long as being in the political arena is 
limited to the distribution of economic resources, it is quite unrealistic to imagine the relinquishing of a 
system that veils the “corrupt” aspects of this relationship chain. 
  
Therefore, the distribution mechanism of economic rent on which all the political parties are in 
agreement or the transformation of what is otherwise known as the corruption economy to an 
instrument of propaganda by rival political parties deserves only to be called hypocrisy and is entirely 
devoid of the concept of a clean society. Today, any strategy waging war against corruption in Turkey 
that fails to place democratization at its centre will be doomed to failure in securing the desired 
success.  
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